

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. FJTA-31243
TO Chief, FE INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. C    D
FROM Chief of Station, C    D    AmB		DATE <b>JAN 12 1960</b>
SUBJECT  POSONNET/1  <i>Kaya Okumura</i>		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED None, for your information and files.		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S) A. FJTW-16216, 21 August 1959 B. FJTW-16660, 10 November 1959		
<p>1. Chief, KUBARK's letter to POSONNET/1 which had been received by Tokyo Station for delivery by C    D    under reference A above was shown to and acknowledged by POSONNET/1 on 14 December 1959. Forwarded herewith is C    D    contact report of the meeting. The Station's inability to establish direct contact with POSONNET/1 earlier was due to the latter's allegedly very tight meeting/conference schedule contingent with his Diet activities.</p> <p>2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, Chief, KUBARK's letter was returned to Station custody. POSONNET/1 was quite agreeable in returning the letter and politely indicated he wished to thank Chief, KUBARK for having remembered him.</p> <p>3. During the summer and fall of 1959 when POSONNET/1 was heavily involved in the LDP's internal house straightening with respect to the Security Treaty, Tokyo Station had ample time to survey his personality and political prowess as reflected in his maneuverings and in his statements. The Station was also able to get additional sidelights on the man's reputation from a variety of contacts and assets. We have come to the conclusion that POSONNET/1, while he may have been a capable pre-war cabinet minister, is now regarded pretty much as a machine-type politician by his colleagues in the LDP. His prominent post is generally regarded by other LDPers as a prestige position doled out by Prime Minister KISHI in his never ending battle to keep the balance of factional power of the LDP in his (KISHI's) favor.</p> <p>4. In the Station's recent contact with POSONNET/1 we found that POSONNET/1 has a distinct tendency to "blow his own trumpet" too loudly and consistently trying to impress the American side with how well he understands the East-West tensions and how he "single-handedly" was able to get the whole LDP in line behind the revision of the Security Treaty. POSONNET/1 is too staid in his ways as a politician of the "old school," we believe, to be willing or even capable of understanding the subtleties of modern-day PP and political action methods. Were he willing to change his pace, he is far too old and pompous to sit and talk details with us. Even during the brief meeting C    D    had with POSONNET/1 the subject always kept returning to the "big picture" concept.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Chief,</p> <p>5. C    D    Station is grateful to KUBARK for the time and effort expended in providing us with an opportunity to establish contact with POSONNET/1 through the medium of his letter. We regret this communication cannot be more positive in content but we feel the next move must be made by POSONNET/1 since we have already quite definitely indicated our willingness to meet with him to discuss the current political situation. As of this writing we are not very optimistic that anything further will result from this relationship.</p>		
<p>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT    EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)</p> <p>(2)(A) Privacy    <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(C) Methods/Sources    <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(D) Foreign Relations    <input type="checkbox"/></p>		
<p>Enclosures:</p> <p>1. Contact Report, h/w</p> <p>2. Iden Sheet to C/R, USC <i>attached RIR</i></p> <p>5 January 1960</p> <p>Distribution:</p> <p>3 - C/FE, w/encls a/s</p> <p>1 - DOPS, w/o encls</p> <p>1 - IOB, w/o encls    1 - CHR, w/o encls</p>		
<p>Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: <i>2000</i></p>		
FORM 10-57 <b>53</b> (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	<p>CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED</p> <p>PAGE NO.</p>

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ATTACHMENT No. 1

FJTA 31243

DATE: JAN. 12 1960

CONTACT REPORT

DATE AND TIME OF CONTACT: 14 December 1959; 1425-1440 hours

EXACT LOCATION: POSONNET/1's Office

ALL PERSONS INVOLVED: POSONNET/1 and [ ]

NEXT MEETING: POSONNET/1's initiative if he chooses; he has been advised of [ ] home telephone number.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

1. By pre-arrangement [ ] called on POSONNET/1 at the latter's business office (iden A) located approximately one block west of the Azabu Prince Hotel. [ ] arrived at the designated meeting site at approximately 1410 hours and noted through the door connecting the office and waiting room that POSONNET/1 was playing GOH (Japanese game similar to chess) with another Japanese guest. The guest departed at 1420 hours and POSONNET/1 continued to move the GOH pieces around by himself until 1425 hours after which he left the room and [ ] was ushered in. Following another three or four minute waiting period POSONNET/1 returned and apologized profusely for the delay "because he was so busy" with Diet affairs. [ ] politely agreed with POSONNET/1 that the affairs of state were no doubt very time consuming.

2. Next, [ ] explained that in view of POSONNET/1's heavy schedule he would dispense with amenities and handed ASCHAM's letter to POSONNET/1 with the reminder that he (DIRMISH) would be happy to translate it for him. POSONNET/1 grunted that that was unnecessary and appeared to be reading the letter. After a few moments of reflection POSONNET/1 merely said "fine, fine." [ ] explained the inadvisability of POSONNET/1's retention of the letter and regained possession of the correspondence without difficulties.

3. POSONNET/1 went on to explain that the Security Treaty revision would go through without any more trouble because "he had seen to it that all internal LDP dissension had been effectively countered by himself." He added that "he was probably the only one in the whole conservative camp who really understood the significance of the Security Treaty revision viz a viz the Japanese/U.S. relationship." For approximately five more minutes POSONNET/1 explained how he "single handly dealt with dissident elements within the very ranks of the LDP who had held up progress of the talks on their insistence for a clarification of the term 'Far East' and on objection to the ten-year period of validity of the proposed treaty." Abruptly, POSONNET/1 changed the subject and claimed that "although he had advised [ ] on this matter several times in the past," he

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noted that "ODYOKE apparently was making little progress or effort in countering Soviet propaganda that ODYOKE was aggressively bent on a warpath." POSONNET/1 suggested that ODYOKE try an intensive PP campaign to show that she had never been an aggressor nation; that all her battles had been defensive ones." He noted that this would make points with the Japanese. [ ] thanked him for his time and advice and indicated that in view of POSONNET/1's busy schedule he would not bother him but if POSONNET/1 at any time desired to transmit information or advice to KUBARK he had but to initiate a telephone call. POSONNET/1 said thank you and preceded [ ] out of the office to his next appointment.

[ ]  
Internal Operations Branch

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C/FE

S/C ATTACHMENT No. 2 FJTA 31243

DATE: JAN 12 1960

IDENTITY SHEET TO POSONNET/1 C/R, DATED 14 DEC 59:

IDENTITY A - SHIN SEI KEI KENKYU KAI (New Political  
Economic Research Society)

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